The politicians hailed it as a diplomatic breakthrough, and analysts were quick to endorse their optimism. In fact the agreement signed last month by China and the Association of Southeast Asian Nations over relations in the East Sea changes almost nothing.
Meeting in Bali, the two sides agreed on eight guidelines to implement the Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in the East Sea, originally signed in 2002. In that declaration, they pledged to settle their differences peacefully, while exercising self-restraint and doing nothing that would "complicate or escalate disputes."

The Bali agreement was possible only because Asean dropped its insistence that the guidelines state that the 10 member nations will confer as a group before discussions with China. This was basically a meaningless concession. Asean members will confer among themselves anyway—indeed, they are obliged to—and China knows that. That the entire agreement hinged on such a charade undermines any claim that it's a sign of serious progress.

.Asean and China are now back near to where they began when they signed the declaration, itself an unsatisfactory compromise for a genuine code of conduct. That Beijing and the Southeast Asians have wasted nine years on a single point of no practical consequence illustrates another reality: They are engaged essentially in a political-diplomatic propaganda game rather than a serious attempt to manage potential conflicts in the East Sea.

Asean tried for years to persuade China to agree to a more binding code of conduct that might prevent Beijing from building new military outposts and engaging in other provocative acts in the area. Such an agreement might have specified geographic coverage, identified particular behavior considered unacceptable and included sanctions for violation of the code.

China resisted, but as it stepped up its so-called charm offensive a decade ago, it agreed to the vague declaration that has been left hanging ever since. While China accepted that a code of conduct was a desirable goal, it gave itself the means of blocking such a code by insisting in the declaration that any agreement be reached by consensus.

Both sides promoted the declaration as an interim step that would signal a higher level of political trust between them and contribute to peace and stability in the East Sea, where China and four Southeast Asian countries have a tangled web of territorial and jurisdictional claims. But in reality it merely took an irritating issue off the agenda while Southeast Asia enjoyed the benefits of increased Chinese trade and investment through a free-trade agreement, also signed in 2002.

The declaration proved ineffective. Although none of the claimants violated a provision on occupying vacant islands or atolls, some took other measures to reinforce their claims, the most assertive being China, whose maps indicate it claims almost the entire East Sea. So after a few years of relative calm, tensions in the area rose dangerously again.

Meanwhile, the Asean-China Joint Working Group charged with implementing the declaration stalled over Beijing's objection to putting in writing that Asean would meet separately before it discusses the matter with China.

Although China had a reason for objecting—it insists that the East Sea disputes be handled bilaterally between claimants and not multilaterally— Asean senior officials have no doubt China was using the issue as an excuse not to implement the declaration.

As this year's Asean Regional Forum loomed in July, all parties decided "to tactically recalibrate their positions and lower tensions for the time being". At least China also had to concede, ever so subtly. It allowed the "summary record" of the meeting between senior Chinese and Asean officials to include a note that Asean intends to continue consulting among members.

Hard-headed strategists in Southeast Asia know that adopting the implementation guidelines is hardly a constraint on China's increasingly aggressive behavior in the East Sea. The real restraint on China is the presence of the U.S. Navy and the need to have stable U.S.-China relations.

The U.S. already waded into the territorial disputes at least once at the behest of Asean members. Last year, after prodding from Vietnam and other Southeast Asian countries, American officials started speaking up, upsetting China. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton, in Hanoi for the Asean Regional Forum, declared a U.S. "national interest" in freedom of navigation in the East Sea. Throwing her weight behind the 2002 declaration, she said: "We encourage the parties to reach agreement on a code of conduct."

Beijing almost certainly agreed to the guidelines out of expediency, because it wanted to reassure Asean after Chinese vessels were involved in some nasty, widely publicized actions in Vietnamese and Philippine waters this year. Presumably China doesn't want Asean members encouraging the Americans to intervene again.

Although Chinese Foreign Minister Yang Jiechi has said the Chinese are open to a code of conduct "at an appropriate time," Southeast Asian officials doubt it. They simply don't believe Beijing had a change of heart. In fact, they fully expect the Chinese to find another pretext to stall the implementation of the declaration.

China may have already found one. According to Southeast Asian diplomats, Beijing has recently notified Asean that it wants to delete its minor concession—Asean's intention to consult—from the summary record of their agreement.

Source: WSJ