VietNamNet Bridge - The process of diplomatic and economic-trade relation normalizations between the U.S and Vietnam has been witnessing the participation of many people in different circumstances and through different ways.

 


Le Van Bang, a student, knew that he would become an officer of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs to work in the division in charge of the affairs with the US, right when he was a last-year student of a university in Cuba. Meanwhile, Ginny Foote, a young lady, joined the Vietnam-US story accidentally.

 

Foote said: “On an autumn day of 1988, after receiving the letter of Vietnamese Foreign Affair Minister Nguyen Co Thach, Bill Sullivan, my boss, told me to go with him to the US State Department. Since then, I had been assigned to undertake the works relating to Vietnam in our NGO, and I had become his efficient assistant in making efforts to normalize the relation between the two countries.”

“Now when remembering that day, I always feel happy. Mr Sullivan asked me to come along simply because he needs someone to accompany him to the State Department ... "

 

Before coming to Vietnam for the first time in May1989, for Ginny Foote, the name “Vietnam” just recalls the memory of a war. Ginny’s close friend’s brother joined the Vietnam War, while her two sisters were participating in antiwar demonstrations, when they were at universities. Sullivan's book and the memories that he told Ginny, all were about the war.

 

"Going through the process of U.S – Vietnam relation normalization, I gradually understand Vietnam as a country, and I try to help other Americans understand this," Foote said.

 

VietNamNet would like to introduce the conversation between our correspondent Huynh Phan and the Chair of the Board US-Vietnam Trade Council (USVTC) Virginia Foote, who still keeps going on the US-Vietnam itinerary.

 

Could you please tell us about the context when the USVTC was established?

 

My boss Bill Sullivan served as U.S ambassador to Laos during the second Indochina War. He holds marathon talks over the years with Vietnamese Foreign Minister Nguyen Co Thach, and they understood each other very well.

 

In autumn of 1988, Foreign Minister Thach invited Sullivan to Vietnam, to discuss about how to promote the normalization of relations. Vietnam wanted to restart the process which was interrupted 10 years ago.

 

Sullivan then consulted the U.S State Department, but they answered: "Not yet. Vietnam has not withdrawn its troops from Cambodia, and we should not rush into contact with them."

 

Later, in May 1989, after some more exchanges between Sullivan and his Minister Thach, the U.S State Department agreed to allow Sullivan to come to Vietnam. I went with him, and that was my first time to Vietnam.

 

Our understanding is that it is difficult to normalize the US-Vietnam diplomatic relations overnight; therefore, the establishment an organization such as USVTC would help Americans learn more about Vietnam’s economy and the potentials of the Vietnamese market, which will serve as the important information for the US President to consider lifting the embargo against Vietnam.

 

However, in the first five years of operation, our main job with USVTC just mainly related to POW/MIA issue, because this was the prerequisite thing for the US to consider lifting the economic embargo against Vietnam and march towards to the normalization of the relation between the two countries.

 

Of course, we still carried out other efforts, together with the business community, to urge President Bush (father) to allow US companies to open representative offices in Vietnam (1992), and President Clinton to turn the green light on for WB and IMF to provide credit to Vietnam (1993).

 

Please tell us your first impressions about Vietnam?

 

Sullivan was happy to return to Vietnam. But he told me he was very sad to see that Vietnam was still poor, although the Vietnam War ended nearly a decade and a half ago.

 

“I understand that the poverty I witnessed when I first came to Vietnam is the result of the post-war isolation. No matter the U.S imposes isolation on Vietnam, or Vietnam chooses to be isolated, the consequences are bad and awful alike.

 

However, it is the driving force for my efforts to promote the embargo and normalization” - Ginny Foote.

 

How did the Vietnamese officials look into you when they met you?

 

(Laugh) They did not look into me. It was Sullivan who caught their look.

 

However, my greatest discovery was that about the personal relationship between Sullivan and Nguyen Co Thach. I could not imagine that. Despite the cruelty of war, the tension in the confrontation between the two sides on the negotiating table, the two men met, talked like the friends in a completely natural and friendly way.

 

Did you meet Thach many times?


We met twice in New York Stone, because he was not allowed to Washington DC. We met in Hanoi more. We had about 3 years working together before he dropped out of the game.

 

How was Thach in your eyes?

 

I feel the story of two decades earlier (the negotiations in Paris) seemed not to influence these two men, Thach and Bill (Sullivan). They argued, then they laughed together. Sometimes they fell into a deadlock, but they all said together: Let's try again!

For them, failure, or stalemate, was only temporary. They believed they would succeed.

 

When looking at them, I draw an important lesson. Sometimes you can be a loser in the negotiations. But behaving properly in the defeat is really the “success” for you for the next negotiations.

 

Ambassador Pham Ngac, interpreter, who made records and was in charge of contacting the U.S. delegation during the Paris negotiations:

 

Ambassador William Sullivan is astute diplomat, who Harriman trusted. In a conference, Harriman deliberately was absent and let Sullivan represent the U.S and demonstrate his talent in the negotiations.

 

Sullivan and Nguyen Co Thach once met before in Geneva Conference on Laos. When the Paris negotiations went to new period, Le Duc Tho returned to Paris. Phan Hien, who later became Minister of Justice, happily told people: "Pele joins us in this trip" (he implied Deputy Foreign Minister Nguyen Co Thach--who was then in charge of the solutions which help score at Paris Conference which was then at the deadlock).

 

As for the US side, Sullivan was present in the negotiation delegation headed by Kissinger.

 

During the meeting, Mr Thach took initiative to create a cooperative atmosphere between the two delegations. He welcomed Mr Sullivan in French: Vous n'avez pas changé.

 

After Kissinger and Le Duc Tho reached basic principles for the agreement, it was Sullivan and Nguyen Co Thach who were responsible for negotiating all the details and completing the text of the agreement and associated documents

 

During negotiations, both sides were very drastic, but they always showed the good wills. During a long arduous negotiation, Sullivan coughed into fits when he was talking. He intended to drink a cup of cold water. However, Mr Thach stopped him and said: "You should not drink cold water, or your cough would be more serious." Then he asked a Vietnamese officer to bring a cup of hot tea for Sullivan. Thach’s behavior really impressed the members of  the U.S delegation.

 

The agreement was completed, but the Saigon government still tried to obstruct the process. Sullivan had to made great efforts to intervene and he joked with Mr Thach that if he fails, he will have to practice "hara-kiri."

 

When U.S Secretary William Rogers and Foreign Minister Nguyen Duy Trinh came to Paris to sign the agreement officially, Rogers, accompanied by Sullivan, met Mr Nguyen Duy Trinh in the corridor. After greeting each other, Rogers said: "Sullivan says he likes Mr Thach because he is … tough.” This is a very American attitude, showing the respect to the opponent after drastic negotiations.

 

Who played important roles in the normalization process, of whom you worked with?

 

Ginny Foote and former Vietnamese Ambassador to the US Le Cong Phung.


For the US side: besides Bill Sullivan and General John Vessey – special envoy of President Reagan and President Bush – are senators John Kerry and John McCain.

 

The two senators are members of the two opposition parties, who have completely different views about the Vietnam War (veteran Kerry joined the anti-war campaign while McCain was a prisoner of war), and their personality is also very different. However, they shared one common thing: they wanted the relationships between the US and Vietnam to be quickly normalized. As members of the POW/MIA sub-committee, both senators worked with many US delegations to Vietnam.

 

And certainly, organizations of American veterans.

 

On the Vietnam side: the Ministry of Foreign Affairs was the pioneer in the normalization process. After Minister Thach, Minister Cam and Deputy Minister Le Mai were very enthusiastic.

 

The Ministry of Defense, Ministry of Public Security and the State Committee for Cooperation and Investment (SCCI) were also active. As I know, in Vietnam decisions are made at high levels.

 

How about the US?

 

It is different. Each member, each group tried to do their tasks and tried to attain the final decision at the highest level.

 

What was the difference between the USVTC and the US government in solving the POW/MIA issue?

 

In the US, the anti-normalization force was much stronger than the support force. Therefore, veteran delegations sent to Vietnam by the USVTC played a very important role.

 

Firstly, we persuaded them to think of going to Vietnam. Senator Kerry invited many veterans to his office, and I was there to answer their questions.

 

When they went to Vietnam, as a member of the executive board of US veterans’ societies, I told Vietnamese partners that if these people (veterans) do not feel comfortable, the normalization process would be in trouble. But everything went smoothly--luckily!

 

Do Muoi (Party Secretary General) treated veterans in a very smart way. I witnessed his meeting with a delegation of VWF, the largest association of veterans in the US, which has millions of members and has a strong voice.

 

Before the meeting, American veterans thought that they might see a red-hot, angry face and a man who kept criticizing the US for what happened in the past. But the meeting did not happen like that.

 

Vietnam’s top leader was smiling to shake hands with them, embraced and kissed them and asked them about their families. He also inquired after their health, their wounds. He even asked a veteran to pull up his shirt to see the veteran’s injury. That was a human experience of me and veterans.

 

By carefully learning the POW/MIA program and thanks to Vietnam’s cooperative attitude, veterans changed their stance at the national veteran congress after that. They supported President Clinton to lift the embargo on Vietnam.

 

You traveled very often between Washington DC and Hanoi during the negotiation processes of Vietnam-US normalization, Vietnam-US bilateral trade agreement, Vietnam’s membership to the World Trade Organization, etc. How did you deal with your family?

 

I always tried to finish my trips to Vietnam as soon as possible so I did not have to be away from home for over a week. Luckily, my husband did not have to go on business very often, even within the US.

 

Before my first trip to Vietnam (May 1989), I stored a lot of food in our fridge but when I came home, the fridge was still full. Since then I’ve never prepared ready food.

 

My daughter accepted the fact that I was always on a long business trip and she did not complain about anything. But I once felt guilty when I left my home on my daughter’s birthday.

 

Thank you very much!