VietNamNet Bridge - Incidents and confrontations at sea pose a major challenge to peace and security in Indo-Pacific Asia.

Ideals of confidence (part 1)
Direct CBMs

A second kind of CBMs comprises those more immediately related to contested zones, contentious issues and threatening capabilities. We call these 'direct CBMs'. In theory, these have more potential than their indirect cousins to reduce risks of confrontation or escalation.

A menu of direct maritime CBMs would include the following:

Channels of continuous communication: Sometimes known as 'hotlines', these include direct telephone lines or agreed communication protocols between leaders or operational commanders, agreed radio frequencies and codes of signalling, or other means of rapid, reliable communication where authorised representatives of one nation can be confident of reaching their counterparts in another nation during a crisis. Another possibility might be the placement of liaison officers with each other's forces or at a neutral monitoring or risk-reduction centre. These would provide opportunity quickly to clarify the nature and declared intention of any seemingly threatening action. Communications channels can be less than effective if there is disagreement on their purpose. For instance, is a hotline meant for advance notice of military activities, or for airing and addressing concerns, or both?

Common standards for communications at sea: International standard protocols exist for communications between ships at sea. But levels of their implementation or comprehensiveness vary, as do interpretations of relevant international laws. In Asia, one well-established multilateral forum on maritime security, the Western Pacific Naval Symposium, has developed a publication known as Communications for Unalerted Encounters at Sea (CUES) for voluntary use among participant nations' navies.

Frequent and flexible dialogue on operational-level issues: Such talks are distinct from wider bilateral security talks in that they could be convened at short notice to address specific concerns about instances of maritime provocation or misunderstanding. Such dialogue might also be convened to improve implementation of agreements and channels of communication.

Formal agreements and shared practical activities related to contested or sensitive zones: These might include coordinated maritime patrols, data-sharing and joint exploration or exploitation of offshore resources. In theory, such steps could be mutually supportive: the ideal would be coordinated patrols to safeguard joint resource projects.

Declarations or non-binding codes of conduct relating to contested or sensitive zones: The impact and value of such rhetorical statements depend largely on wider contexts of political trust and actual behaviour. They could be unilateral, bilateral or multilateral.

Formal agreements to set rules and guidelines for each side's behaviour: In the maritime domain, the model for this is the 1972 Incidents at Sea (INCSEA) Agreement established between the United States and the Soviet Union during the Cold War to prevent frequent interactions from leading to serious incidents. A successor text is still in force between the United States and Russia, and many similar bilateral agreements now exist in Europe, with a 1993 agreement between Russia and Japan the only Asian example. Such agreements reduce risks of collisions, curb provocative actions such as aiming weapons during peacetime, and build predictability into interactions at sea. Importantly, an INCSEA agreement is not an arms control process predicated on influencing the size, force- structure or weaponry of states party to the agreement; rather, it is a method of risk reduction. Nor is an INCSEA agreement meant to replace global regulations.
 
or understandings on the normal conduct of vessels.

The US-Soviet INCSEA agreement provided for:

•    measures to avoid collision
•    prevention of interference in formations of the other party
•    avoidance of manoeuvres in areas of heavy shipping
•    maintenance of safe distance between vessels
•    the use of accepted signals when manoeuvring
•    not simulating attacks, launching objects or illuminating the bridges of other party's ships
•    requiring aircraft to use caution and prudence when approaching or operating near ships and aircraft of the other party
•    the provision of warning (three to five days) prior to major naval and military activities on the high seas.

In principle, formal confidence-building agreements need not only bilateral, as demonstrated by the multilateral CSCE process in Europe, which required prior notification of military manoeuvres. There is, however, little serious expectation of early or rapid progress on an Indo-Pacific maritime equivalent of such measures, given the difficulty in achieving even bilateral agreements, and the agonisingly slow process of building consensus in forums as disparate as the ARF. If, on the other hand, major powers, particularly the United States and China, made a breakthrough on this front, it could establish a persuasive norm for other regional nations.
 
Covering all bases: a comprehensive approach

Even the most hopeful advocates of CBMs would not suggest that any single step could somehow establish trust or resolve differences. Instead, the ideal is a comprehensive regime of CBMs, operating on multiple tracks and levels. Direct and indirect CBMs can be mutually reinforcing, and nations serious about military risk reduction and constructive engagement would typically pursue a combination of approaches: direct and indirect, bilateral and multilateral.

This requires serious allocation of time and senior personnel. For example, the military element of a truly comprehensive approach to bilateral engagement could involve somewhere between five and seven levels of regular interaction, including ministerial meetings, service chiefs, strategic-level naval talks, operational working groups and individual units. Multilateral engagement, too, might range across several levels from ministerial to tactical.

In addition, CBMs focused on reducing military tensions often need the involvement of non-military players. Other government and even non-government entities with a role in maritime security can be part of the solution. They may be able to interact with their foreign counterparts with more flexibility and openness than military personnel are allowed, as the US-China experience of coastguard cooperation suggests.

At the same time, such non-military entities can be part of the problem. Coastguard and surveillance organisations, law enforcement agencies, fisheries authorities and other maritime auxiliaries can be the initial parties to an incident at sea, as can commercial fishing vessels. The 2010 Senkaku/ Diaoyu Islands incident involved the Japanese coastguard and a Chinese fishing boat, while the 2009 Impeccable incident involved Chinese fisheries vessels. An INCSEA agreement between navies alone would be of limited value if much of the trouble involved auxiliaries (as in the US-China relationship).

Either way, a thorough maritime CBMs regime requires each government involved being able to control its civilian as well as military assets. Effective CBMs need rigorous internal coordination and management within the states concerned. Poor interagency communication, dysfunctional crisis-response mechanisms, institutional rivalries, indiscipline, or substandard military and seafaring skills could all sabotage even the most well-intentioned security initiatives.

But the crucial ingredient is political will. CBMs can achieve little if the parties disagree on their content or purpose, or if the risky activities they are meant to address are in fact deliberate acts of policy linked to clashes of interests.

Rory Medcalf, Raoul Heinrichs, Justin Jones  
Lowy Institute