Vietnamnet.vn
Podcast
Nationalism may also influence how the Chinese navy is used. So some assertive Chinese maritime behaviour may be intended as a demonstration of naval capability to Chinese audiences, designed to reinforce the status of China's leadership and military as defenders of sovereignty.
Institutional pressures and opacity
Confrontations at sea may also serve to influence policy debates within China, including within the PLA. There has been wide speculation about the increasing independence of action and expression by PLA officers, and it is possible that some officers use incidents at sea to seek status and career advancement, even while others may be concerned about the risks involved.
It is also possible that assertive military behaviour may be intended by particular players and interests within the Chinese system to establish precedents and 'facts on the ground' - or more accurately facts in the water and the air - that influence national policy in directions less accommodating of foreign interests. This is one possible explanation for the overt testing of new weapons at politically sensitive times - for instance, the J-20 stealth fighter flight during US Defense Secretary Robert Gates' visit to Beijing in January 2011, or the 2007 test of an anti-satellite missile. A similar logic may be at work in some maritime confrontations.
What appear to be calculated national provocations may in part be the result of 'bureaucracies behaving badly', of agencies failing to coordinate - deliberately or not. Due in large part to the opacity of Chinese defence policy, other militaries and policymakers seeking to understand and respond to Chinese-initiated maritime incidents face the critical problem of trying to work out why each event has happened. There are at least five possible interpretations for each such incident.
Is it at the instigation of the high echelons of political leadership in Bejing? Is it at the direction of senior levels within the PLA, acting without civilian sanction or direction? Does it reflect positioning for influence in PLA doctrinal debates, or perhaps contests for career advancement? Is it essentially a decision by a local PLA unit commander, or indeed the spontaneous action of a reckless naval officer or pilot? Or does it involve a measure of miscommunication or accident?
Almost any answer carries some disturbing implications. If Beijing does authorise or direct its naval commanders to engage in confrontational behaviour, this would confirm perceptions of overall Chinese assertiveness on Beijing's part, which some analysts see as an attempt to push back US primacy in East Asia and perhaps even try to replace it with some form of Chinese dominance.
If the explanation is a PLA acting regardless of civilian policy, then incidents at sea reflect a deep problem in Chinese civil-military relations. If it is a case of an individual taking unauthorised risks, this points to dangerously poor discipline or seamanship in Chinese maritime forces. And if, instead, an incident is truly unintended, the implication could be of incompetence within the ranks - again, a sign of trouble ahead. The reality could well be a mix of all of the above.
Territorial disputes
Within the muddle of overlapping sovereignty claims in the East Sea, China's disputes with Vietnam and the Philippines stand out. What makes these differences so vexed and liable to maritime incidents is not just the number of claimants and complex set of overlapping claims, but also the intersection of economic, geostrategic and symbolic nationalist issues at stake.
The disputed islands in the East Sea - or more precisely their surrounding waters - are in many cases believed to be rich in hydrocarbon deposits as well as fish stocks. Geostrategically, they sit astride vital sea lines that connect East Asia, via the Indian Ocean, to the Middle East and Europe - and in the vicinity of chokepoints such as the Strait of Malacca that China fears could be used to blockade its energy supply. And, just as importantly, the disputes are bound up with emotive issues of nationalism and identity.
Throughout the 1980s and 1990s, these differences led to frequent tensions and even occasional armed clashes. From the late 1990s onwards, however, the East Sea seemed to recede in regional strategic calculations, as China deferred its claims to allay Southeast Asian threat perceptions. Yet while China and ASEAN agreed in 2002 to a non-binding declaration regarding conduct in the East Sea, there has been little progress towards the stated aim of an effective code of conduct.
Despite Chinese claims in late 2010 that it was interested in renewed efforts on this front, fresh maritime incidents have since occurred between China and the Philippines as well as China and Vietnam. The East Sea is re-emerging as a regional security flashpoint, and one which might draw in the United States, and perhaps even other geographically distant stakeholders such as Australia. In 2010, reports emerged of senior Chinese officials referring to the South China Sea as a 'core interest' - an issue, like Taiwan, Tibet and Xinjiang, over which Beijing might contemplate the use of armed force. These reports have since been contested, and it is plausible that there are internal differences within China over how hard to push on the East Sea - or perhaps Beijing's stance eased slightly in response to the ensuing solidarity and outrage of many other states.
After all, the United States responded firmly, by asserting its own inalienable interests, using an ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) meeting in Hanoi to reaffirm its commitment to 'freedom of navigation, open access to Asia's maritime commons and respect for international law in the East Sea.' The 'core interests' furore of mid-2010 also encouraged close security engagement between the United States and Vietnam, as well as US-led efforts to make the East Sea an accepted topic for dialogue in multilateral forums.
China's territorial dispute with Japan in the East China Sea has many of the same elements - symbolic, economic and geostrategic - with the added ingredient of mutual historical mistrust and antagonism between Beijing and Tokyo. The dispute dates back to the Sino-Japanese war of 1894-95, and plays into nationalist narratives in both countries. Today, the East China Sea is a maritime domain of increasing importance to China, Japan and the United States. Each side is investing in military capabilities aimed at denying the space to the other during conflict.
The seabed surrounding the disputed Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands is believed to be rich in hydrocarbon deposits, and moreover is located between countries with voracious appetites for energy. Attempts at locking in a workable agreement on joint development of resources have floundered.
Instead, the East China Sea has become the site of frequent incidents involving Chinese and Japanese naval units, auxiliaries and civilian vessels. In July 2004, for example, a Chinese naval vessel manoeuvred in dangerous proximity to a Japanese survey ship in the area. A year later Chinese warships were observed close to a disputed gas field, with one reportedly training its main gun at a Japanese surveillance aircraft. And many of the already-recounted Sino-Japanese incidents of 2010 and 2011 have also had a strong territorial and resource-security dimension.
The possibility of confrontation leading to conflict between Japan and China in the East China Sea is a distinct possibility. This would have direct implications for the credibility of the United States as an ally of Japan. In the past 12 months, an understanding appears to have developed between Washington and Tokyo that, under the US-Japan security treaty, the United States would come to Japan's assistance in the event of such a conflict. Were Washington to do so, it would be in direct conflict with China, with the risk of a wide and protracted war between the two powers. Yet were Washington to hold back, its credibility as an ally would be shaken, not only in Japan but globally.
Rising risks, deepening dangers
During the Cold War, an eventual recognition of the dangers of unconstrained military provocation at sea led the United States and the Soviet Union to conclude that the risks exceeded any strategic or political benefit. Thus they took historic steps - notably concluding the 1972 Incidents at Sea (INCSEA) agreement - to impose sharp limits on the number and severity of such encounters.
At present, there is no similar meeting of minds between China and other powers in Indo-Pacific Asia. Yet the continued occurrence of incidents at sea between Chinese and other forces involves the risk of grave consequences. Beyond the danger to the individuals, vessels and aircraft involved, at least four types of serious security impacts are possible:
• Diplomatic tensions and potentially a wider crisis, as occurred after the 2001 EP-3 incident and the 2010 Senkaku/Diaoyu incident: this could involve damaging but non-military escalation such as economic sanctions or the suspension of dialogue.
• An accumulation of strategic mistrust: each incident, especially if it involved diplomatic crisis or the threat or use of force, could make subsequent incidents even harder to manage or resolve peacefully, and could add to wider difficulties in reducing mutual threat perceptions.
• Localised armed conflict: resort to the use of force by either or both parties to the incident, which would lead to major diplomatic tensions and the possibility of wider confrontation or conflict.
• Escalation to larger-scale conflict: this might involve reinforcements to the initial units in the encounter, or forces sent by an ally or other third party. Retaliatory strikes or threats might be inflicted against targets elsewhere, with the possibility - however remote - of an incident becoming the catalyst for a wider war. In most circumstances, political leaders would have opportunities to halt the fighting at any early, limited stage. Much would depend, however, on whether the provocative incident in question had occurred in the context of a pre-existing crisis.
It may seem far-fetched to suggest that major confrontation or conflict between major powers in 21st-century Asia could arise from a small-scale maritime incident. After all, the region is prosperous and economically interdependent. All major nations have vast stakes in peace and stability and the existence of nuclear weapons further reduces the possibility of major-power war. But even if the probability of escalation to war is small, the international impact would be calamitous. If there are possible measures to reduce these risks, they would seem to be worth attempting.
Rory Medcalf, Raoul Heinrichs, Justin Jones
Lowy Institute
.svg){kind=icon}
