Chinese views 1: the official line

Part 1: Incidents, confrontation and crisis in Indo-Pacific Asia

Part 2: Naval nationalism

Part 3: Ideals of confidence 1

A starting point for appraising Chinese attitudes to security CBMs is 'China's National Defense in 2010', the Chinese defence white paper released in early 2011, itself touted as an act of improved transparency. On the surface, this document makes much of the various ways in which Beijing has enhanced its security engagement and dialogue with other nations since the 1990s. It suggests that China is ready and willing to engage with others on a range of direct and indirect CBMs, including in relation to potential maritime incidents. But close attention to the text's nuances and contradictions suggests that such may not yet be the case.

The document places much store on dialogues and consultations with other countries, including with the United States, Japan and India, and suggests a willingness to hold talks with China's neighbours on 'regional flashpoint issues'. Yet it also emphasises that 'political mutual trust' should be the 'groundwork' for CBMs, implying that this should be a precondition rather than their goal. Moreover, military confidence-building 'should be based on mutual respect for core interests' - the implication being that differences on such issues as the status of Taiwan, or possibly of Chinese maritime territorial claims, need somehow to be agreed upon with other powers before they can expect serious military CBMs with China.

The white paper also portrays a stark difference between maritime and land-boundary issues. It declares that Beijing supports 'border area confidence-building measures' and 'actively prevents dangerous military activities' so as to 'preserve peace and stability on the borders'. Reference is made to formal CBM agreements with many of its land neighbours, notably force reductions with Russia and other Shanghai Cooperation Organisation members, as well as military CBMs on the Line of Actual Control that comprises much of the boundary with India.

But the document's references to maritime CBMs are much less substantial, reflecting both the thinness of what has been accomplished in this field and likely a deep reluctance in Beijing to go much further. Much is made of the 1998 MMCA with the United States, with the claim that meetings held under its auspices have contributed to 'the safety of maritime activities and the avoidance of accidents'. The document says little about handling tensions with Japan, beyond noting that since 2008 Beijing and Tokyo 'have held several consultations over the establishment of a maritime liaison mechanism', a much more cautious reference than earlier media reports that military or leaders-level 'hotlines' were on the verge of implementation.

The Chinese white paper's account of maritime relations with South Korea is more positive: it notes the establishment of direct telephone links between Chinese naval and air units stationed in adjacent areas. Regarding Vietnam, the paper highlights a 2005 agreement that has led to twice-yearly combined maritime patrols, though there is no reminder that this has occurred alongside incidents at sea between China and Vietnamese vessels or deepening bilateral mistrust over the East Sea generally. Meanwhile, the white paper has nothing direct to say on the maritime dimension of Sino-Indian relations.

Chinese views 2: cross-currents

Beijing's policy thinking on maritime security is neither monolithic nor static. There are serious, if sometimes submerged, debates within expert, policy and military circles. Recent Western scholarship has highlighted a range of contending views and actors in China's external policymaking, and the authors' research discussions confirm that this debate extends to some degree to questions of whether and how to engage with other powers, especially the United States and Japan, in managing or preventing confrontations at sea.

Moreover, Beijing's policy rhetoric shows some signs of adjusting to external pressures and expectations: for instance, a mid-2011 speech by the Defence Minister, General Liang Guanglie, used the formulation 'trust starts with engagement' showing some surprising movement from the prevailing Chinese stance that trust should form the groundwork of engagement. This speech is one of the more sophisticated public expressions to date of Chinese defence and security policy - crafted for foreign diplomatic sensibilities - and fits with assessments that Beijing sees a need to repair its damaged image after the maritime turbulence of 2010. This judgment is supported by emerging hints that - alongside continuing incidents at sea - Beijing is making some diplomatic efforts to renew dialogue with Southeast Asian states on East Sea issues, notably the implementation and possible strengthening of a 2002 declaration that was supposed to lead to a code of conduct. One interpretation of this is that Beijing is seeking to erode the diplomatic solidarity that the United States and ASEAN states showed on East Sea issues in regional forums in 2010.

On balance, the events of recent years suggest that China's internal champions of engagement, dialogue and confidence-building are not in the ascendant. In the wake of events like the Impeccable incident, China's indifference to the sinking of the Cheonan, PLA-N helicopter harassment of Japanese warships and the PLA's rejection of military dialogue with the United States throughout the tensions of 2010, it is not very surprising that some foreign observers have concluded that further efforts at engagement and confidence-building with China are likely to be spurned. Any bid by Beijing to mend its image after the serial misadventures of 2010 will need to go well beyond rhetoric for that view to change.

Such wariness is understandable. Our research suggests the following key judgments about Chinese attitudes regarding the purpose, prospects and limits of maritime confidence-building with strategic competitors in Indo-Pacific Asia:

There is a debate within China about the value and modalities of maritime CBMs and of CBMs more generally: This occurs ultimately within official policy circles and the military, but is also conducted and reflected in think tanks and research institutions, sometimes in the public arena. The middle ground in that debate acknowledges the need to consider CBMs, particularly dialogue, but is sceptical about how effective they can be.

As one Chinese analyst explained to us, despite the absence of much evidence of the value of US-China military ties, there was still a general view in Beijing that such a relationship was useful, including for crisis control. A central dilemma in the debate, in terms of Chinese national interests, was expressed by another Chinese analyst: to reduce risks of conflict, there needed to be self-restraint by all powers, yet Beijing could not afford to be seen to bow to foreign pressure. To do so would allow foreign powers to take advantage of China and would also weaken the internal authority of Chinese government, jeopardising national development.

The hardliners have been winning the debate: China's official stance and its actions strongly suggest that the debate has been resolved, for the time being, in favour of a position opposed to an ambitious agenda of maritime CBMs in Asia. (This is notwithstanding the interesting rhetorical shift present in the Defence Minister's June 2011 speech referred to above.)

China is not seeking a near-term repeat of the tensions of 2010: There was widespread concern in the Chinese analytical community that the maritime security turbulence of 2010 was not in China's interests and that the region could not afford for heightened tensions to continue. In the words of one Chinese analyst: Major actors in major incidents have been coming through a learning curve. So we now need an uneventful period We have to keep the situation cool. That means no more major exercises and no more major provocative statements.

The impression was repeatedly conveyed that China could not afford more maritime security trouble at least until its leadership transition in 2012.

The prevailing view in China is that direct maritime CBMs can only occur once a degree of strategic trust has been established: In the words of one senior scholar and former PLA general: f the United States, in its strategic thinking, still regards China as the substitute of the former Soviet Union or a potential strategic adversary to defend against, bilateral military relations will be hard to improve, and bilateral friction will continue.

Under this seemingly paradoxical position, it would seem that China will be open to the most effective kinds of CBMs only when they are no longer needed. Such a sequence - trust first, engage later - is at odds with Washington's approach, or indeed with the accepted logic of CBMs in much of the world. That logic, drawing upon Cold War experience in Europe and between the Americans and the Soviets globally, is that CBMs can and should precede any possible resolution of strategic differences, and indeed may help make that resolution possible.

Yet Beijing can be more flexible when it decides this suits its interests. Diplomacy with its land neighbours in recent decades shows that Beijing is sometimes willing to pursue CBMs as a way to build trust rather than simply reflect it. Moreover, some Chinese experts argue that US-China differences are not really about the sequence of trust and CBMs, but rather about defining what kind of trust is being sought, tactical (the US view) or strategic and political (China's view).

But other Chinese scholars suggest that nothing short of US accommodation of China's self-defined, sovereignty-related interests over Taiwan would allow for strategic trust,115 and thus presumably a trusting or cooperative military relationship. In the words of one analyst: The Taiwan issue remains central. If that is solved then all other issues between the United States, including military-military relations, can be discussed. So for the US-China military-military dialogue really to work, ultimately there is a need to address these main issues.

China's definition of strategic trust involves other powers' acceptance of its self- defined 'core interests', territorial claims and interpretation of UNCLOS: This would suggest that effective direct CBMs will be extremely difficult to achieve in the absence of one or more fundamental changes in America's Asia policy: notably an end to arms sales to Taiwan and the cessation of intelligence-gathering in China's Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ).

There is little sign of an appetite in China for an Incidents at Sea agreement: The interplay of risky maritime incidents and deep-seated sovereignty disputes adds a dimension that was not present during the pursuit of US-Soviet CBMs, and is a major obstacle to any US-China INCSEA agreement, even if there was in-principle interest in either or both nations in pursuing one. During our consultations, no Chinese analyst raised the idea of an INCSEA agreement between China and any other nation.

China's apparent lack of interest in such an agreement with the United States may be explained both by the seemingly irreconcilable nature of their strategic differences - such as over the status of Taiwan and US activities in China's EEZ - and by the fact that, despite this, their military relationship is not strictly or solely an adversarial one. The Soviet Union and the United States were enemies. Yet against a backdrop of both the United States and China proclaiming objectives of security cooperation, Beijing is not eager to negotiate an agreement reminiscent of one between enemies - even though such an agreement could have stabilising benefits.

But some other voices present a different or at least more nuanced perspective: In addition to the Defence Minister's mid-2011 statement that 'trust starts with engagement', one Chinese scholar recently argued that US intelligence-gathering in its EEZ should not become a fundamental barrier to any agreement upon maritime CBMs. There is, however, little sign that this view is translating into an easing of policy. The Defence Minister's rhetoric was not accompanied by any tangible steps towards agreement on new CBMs with the United States, and came within days of fresh incidents in the East Sea.

Dialogue is necessary and cutting off defence talks is recognised as a bad idea: Military contacts have tended to be the first diplomatic channel to be broken - by either side - during wider crises in Sino-US relations. In recent years, it has been Beijing that has called them off. But there is growing recognition across much of the Chinese security community - including in the PLA - that it is not in China's interests to suspend military dialogue with the United States every time Beijing needs to signal its objection to a US policy on a 'core interest' such as Taiwan.

But that does not mean that Chinese suspension of military dialogue with America is a thing of the past: High-level defence visits and dialogue resumed, cautiously, at the end of 2010. Yet it may only be a matter of time before Beijing feels compelled to suspend talks again. As some Chinese analysts pointed out, an alternative means of conveying anger is proving hard to find:

It is true that US-China military ties bear the brunt  of political tensions. It is easy to cut these ties because we are not very integrated in this area. Whereas we cannot economically sanction each other, we are too interdependent.

And, from a Chinese military analyst: We should not keep stopping military exchanges with the United States each time we are unhappy... But we have no other way of showing our indignation. The problem is that we do not want to hurt our economic interests, these are too enmeshed. The US military has been suggesting alternatives, such as stopping some military exchanges but not completely cutting them all off.

Maritime assertiveness is partly for domestic audiences: A range of Chinese sources suggest that China's acts and statements of maritime assertiveness are seen as necessary to uphold national interests, and to demonstrate to domestic audiences that national interests and prestige are being upheld. By this logic, US maritime intelligence-gathering in China's EEZ might be seen as a continuation of the historical humiliation of China - intolerable for political as well as military reasons. If that is so, then periodic instances of Chinese maritime harassment would seem likely to continue, in spite of the risks.

Maritime assertiveness can be consistent with stability, even if the assertiveness is mutual: One line of thought in China's security community is that alarm about incidents at sea is exaggerated, and mutual assertiveness can amount to mutual deterrence rather than conflict. One Chinese analyst suggested: If we show a firm attitude then that way others [the United States and
Japan] will be self-constrained. And it is understandable if the United States does this too: that way we are self-constrained.

China is well aware that the stabilising value of indirect CBMs involving cooperation on transnational security issues is actually very limited: Whatever the official rhetoric, there are plenty of Chinese security thinkers who are sceptical about whether cooperation on transnational or 'non-traditional' issues - like counter-piracy and disaster relief - can contribute much towards building trust on interstate security differences.

China remains deeply sensitive to any suggestion that multilateral forums should discuss maritime disputes or incidents: In the words of one analyst: The United States wanted to talk about the East Sea in the ASEAN Defence Ministers Meeting Plus Eight. China would not attend if the East Sea was discussed. And if China was not in that meeting, then that would be a failure of regional security institutions. But in the end the East Sea was off the agenda, so China did attend Traditional security should be dealt with bilaterally.

Institutional pressures, personal ambitions and independent acts of adventurism within the PLA are part of the problem: These concerns were implied - albeit cautiously and indirectly - by a range of Chinese analysts, and have been expressed to other foreign researchers. Some acknowledged that China had failed in publicly presenting a convincing explanation for the helicopter buzzing incidents against Japanese ships.

Still, China sees no pressing need to ease its stance on maritime relations with Japan: Despite the growing number of maritime encounters with Japan, the Chinese security establishment appears unwilling to attempt new CBMs in the East China Sea dispute. From our consultations, the PLA was more concerned to restore engagement with its American than with its Japanese counterparts. No explanations were offered about the cause or purpose of the various helicopter buzzing incidents against Japanese warships. China is noticeably more willing to develop CBMs with other maritime neighbours than with Japan.

Indifference to India as a maritime power is receding, slightly: Views within Beijing are mixed on whether or how to engage with India on maritime security issues. During our consultations, some analysts insisted that security tensions between India and China are much more likely on land than at sea. A broad range of experts also stressed that China's immediate maritime security attention remains heavily focused on disputed East Asia waters. There was nonetheless a growing recognition of a need to find ways to engage with India: some analysts acknowledged that India's superior military capabilities in the Indian Ocean, and its relations with the United States, made New Delhi a more important security actor for Beijing to communicate with than it had been in the past. It was argued that China's maritime concerns with India were about apparent Indian aims of excluding other powers from the Indian Ocean, as well as about future possible Indian naval activity in East Asia as a US partner. Several Chinese analysts acknowledged that China ought to reassure India about the purpose of its (counter- piracy) naval deployments in the Indian Ocean. It was even suggested that China and India might establish some kind of maritime security dialogue to complement their existing modest defence links.

Against the tide?

Chinese views on maritime security tensions and CBMs are more layered and complex than can be explained by a simple thesis of strategic assertiveness. The Beijing security community is not oblivious to the possibility that incidents at sea could escalate, or to the need for some kind of risk-reduction measures. But degrees of concern vary, and do not approach those driving American or even Japanese policy.

On balance, Beijing appears to have decided it is willing to tolerate - and sometimes knowingly contribute to - a risk of unlooked-for conflict that other nations recognise as worryingly high. A critical question, then, is whether the lead decision-makers in Beijing - civilian and military - can be persuaded of an overriding need to prioritise practical measures to prevent violent incidents at sea. As the concluding chapter will outline, the present outlook is not promising, though some incremental steps are possible.

Rory Medcalf, Raoul Heinrichs, Justin Jones
Lowy Institute