The goal of average GDP growth of 10 percent/year or more in the 2026–2030 period, set by the 14th Congress, is a strong declaration. It is not just about speed, but about the aspiration of bringing Vietnam beyond the middle-income level, closer to the $8,500 GDP/person mark by 2030, and further to becoming a developed, high-income nation by 2045.

But double-digit growth is not just a story of pure political determination. It is a problem of internal strength.

On the surface, Vietnam’s foundation appears solid. In 2025, its GDP exceeded $510 billion; GDP per capita reached $5,000; and growth surpassed 8 percent, placing Vietnam among the world’s faster-growing economies amid persistent global uncertainty. Public investment has been accelerated, tourism has rebounded, and major infrastructure projects continue to break ground.

However, as Nguyen Van Phuc, former Vice Chair of the NA’s Economic Committee, has repeatedly cautioned, a high GDP does not automatically translate into robust internal capacity.

GDP measures the total value created in a year, but it does not answer the most critical question: how much of that value remains within the national economy. 

A significant portion of growth is generated by the FDI sector, while part of the final profits flows abroad. Without examining GDP alongside Gross National Income (GNI), it is easy to fall into a growth illusion, where headline figures rise faster than the economy’s true internal capacity.

An economy may grow rapidly while real household income rises slowly; GDP may expand while domestic accumulation capacity remains weak. That is not a sustainable path. 

Strong FDI, thin domestic capacity

Statistics show that the FDI sector accounted for roughly 76 percent of export turnover in 2025.

This raises a fundamental question: why, after nearly 40 years of Doi Moi (renovation), does the domestic sector still contribute only about one-quarter of total export turnover?

When FDI enterprises account for nearly three-quarters of exports and the entire domestic sector just one-quarter, this is the signal of an imbalanced growth: FDI is strong, while domestic capacity remains thin. Export volumes are high, yet domestic value added is modest.

Meanwhile, imports of input materials remain substantial: imports from China alone account for roughly 40 percent of total import turnover. Without strengthening domestic production capacity, increasing localization rates, and expanding domestic value added, high growth will become increasingly dependent on external forces.

If Vietnamese firms are not large enough to integrate deeply into supply chains, lack the capacity to produce import substitutes, or are unable to expand exports under their own brands, then growth will increasingly lie beyond the control of Vietnam’s own economy.

To achieve double-digit growth in the coming period, Vietnam cannot rely on the old momentum. Ten percent growth cannot come from simply doing more of the same. 

It must come from a different growth model, the one in which productivity, quality, and value added form the core pillar. In that model, science and technology, innovation, and digital transformation are not slogans, but core competencies of domestic enterprises.

Domestic strength is not just about capital; it is about mastering technology, data, and value chains. At the same time, an economy of nearly 100 million people cannot grow sustainably if the domestic market plays only a secondary role. Domestic consumption and import substitution must become engines alongside exports, providing an internal anchor that reduces external dependence.

Private and state economic sectors

The 14th National Party Congress and Resolution 68 identify the private sector as one of the most important drivers of the economy. Yet in 2025, private investment grew by only about 8.4 percent, significantly lower than public investment and FDI.

The issue is not that the private sector lacks capital or ambition. As Nguyen Van Phuc has analyzed, its resources have not been fully unlocked. Legal risks, inconsistent policy implementation, and the gap between reform rhetoric and businesses’ real-world experiences remain barriers.

The 10 percent growth question, therefore, cannot be solved by simply expanding public investment or attracting more FDI at any cost. The role of the State must be properly redefined.

The state sector should focus on strategic and foundational areas that create platforms and provide direction, rather than joining other players in the same playing ground. 

More importantly, the State must fully transition to a developmental, enabling role: improving the institutional regime, protecting property rights, reducing policy uncertainty, and building long-term confidence for domestic investors.

Ten percent growth is not impossible. Vietnam grew even faster during its most dynamic transformation periods. But unlike the past, today’s growth space no longer lies in cheap labor or in broad-based investment expansion.

Lan Anh