VietNamNet Bridge - Resignation will gradually transform into the forced acceptance of the de facto control of China in the East Sea (internationally known as the South China Sea) and then the existence of the conventions on the law of the sea cannot do much to change the fact: the U-shaped line is established gradually in practice.

Along with economic growth, this sea route has become increasingly vital to China. But it is also vital to the US, Japan and other countries in the region.

The collaboration of international maritime security between China and the US, Japan and ASEAN would be ideal for the stability and prosperity of the region. But turning the international waters into the territorial waters of China is a more secure guarantee for China, at the cost of the sovereignty of the smaller countries in the region which has been violated. In other words, we are witnessing a process that China is trying to put pressure on small countries to redraw the regional map.

The bullying, or bilateral dispute over maritime sovereignty, the rights of fishing and exploring oil and gas are just the first step, which is within a larger dispute over the control of the strategic maritime route passing the East Sea, with more than 1/3 of global trade passing through the waters. To avoid a conflict of freedom of navigation in the future, we must understand the loss and gain of each side in the game that China is conducting. What's China's expectation?

The long-term goal of China is to control the international shipping route, from the Near East through the Indian Ocean to the East Sea.

And why is bullying the smaller nations the short-term stepping stone for achieving long-term goal of China of controlling the strategic sea route through the East Sea? Answering such questions would help find a mechanism to promote regional security, through peaceful negotiation solutions.

Let’s look at the events that occurred in 2011, 2012 when China cut cables of Vietnam’s Binh Minh 02 ship or its deployment of 981 rig in the waters of Vietnam in 2014. China built iron columns and floats at Amy Douglas in 2011 and occupied the Scarborough Shoal in 2012.

Facing China’s provoking acts, the Philippines and Vietnam may have five main options: First, no reaction.Second, issuing diplomatic notes opposing China’s acts at bilateral or multilateral forums, such as the UN. Third, take the matter to the International Court. Fourth, take self-defence action with restraint, but in essence, still willing to make concessions to avoid conflict escalation. For example, the Philippines pulled up iron columns, or arrested Chinese fishing boats infringing in the exclusive economic zone or Vietnam marine police force asked China to remove its oil rig out of Vietnam’s waters.

Fifth, resolutely defend the integrity of sovereignty, without any compromises. For example, Japan nationalized the Senkaku; and the US claimed to include Senkaku in the Japan-US security treaty.

If the case is bilateral conflict, then making a protest by issuing diplomatic note is almost like doing nothing. Bringing the case to an international court is often very costly, time consuming and prone to become complicated, because international laws are not sufficiently detailed to immediately settle such proceedings.

Finally, upon the occurrence of a sequence of consecutive disputes, the complexity of the case can only increase. And the risk of conflict could break out. It, of course only benefits the larger party, which uses the power to put pressure, rather than the smaller side, which is abused, but is forced to react with restraint and compromise. In the long run, it is like not doing anything to avoid an outbreak of conflict.

Thus, from the standpoint of the Chinese, provoking smaller countries in the East Sea regarding the right of fishing or oil and gas exploration would be beneficial because : (i) China can keep the level of conflict small enough, to maintain bilateral conflicts, which the aggrieved party cannot do anything to change the outcome of the situation; and (ii) the chain of conflicts must be continuously and evenly at all strategic points in the East Sea, to turn fait accompli into the actual control of China on the exploitation of natural resources, which only the sovereign state is allowed to do.

Specifically, the Philippines’ chasing Chinese fishing boats and pulled up the piles that China plugged at rocks may only increase the risk that Beijing declares that the Philippines will suffer the action of "law enforcement" of China. Facing superior and increasing military strength of China, the smaller countries in the region may face risks that will bear huge losses, if one dares to resist its so-called action of "law enforcement" of China alone.

Foreseeing such outcomes, small countries may do nothing, except for issuing diplomatic note of opposition, which in essence is doing nothing. Because of the logic of that oppression Vietnam did not do anything when the Chinese issued the ban of fishing for a long time, on a vast sea, including the continental shelf of Vietnam.

Resignation will gradually transform into the required approval of the facto control of China in the East Sea. In that situation, the existence of the Conventions on the Law of the Sea, including the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea 1982 (UNCLOS 1982) is unable to do much to change the fact: the U-shaped line has been established gradually in practice.

That implies the strategic maritime route passing through the East Sea will gradually belong to China. Other countries will be required to comply with the new order, which is enforced by the military power of China, which is predicted to challenge the US in the Western Pacific in 2030.

China’s strategy of oppression in order to monopolise the East Sea can be summarized as follows:

Immediately after China’s invasion of the right of exploitation of resources belonging to the sovereignty of other countries, such as catching fish or exploration of oil in the waters of Vietnam and the Philippines, specifically the deployment of the oil rig 981 in the waters of Vietnam, if it did not face reaction from Vietnam and the Philippines, China would have recorded one score in the chain of provoking actions to annex the East Sea. In that context, Vietnam/the Philippines would have lost 1 score in the defense of sovereignty.

Another option is that instead of doing nothing, Vietnam/the Philippines will react resolutely, in accordance with regional agreements and international conventions. But soon after facing this defensive reaction of Vietnam/the Philippines, China can respond in two ways: Firstly, respect its commitments on the code of conduct (DOC) in the East Sea and the UNCLOS. Thus, the parties achieve reconciliation after the conflict. China does not earn any score in the chain of provoking acts to annex the East Sea and Vietnam/the Philippines do not lose any score on sovereignty.

In contrast, China can ignore its commitments and international law. Specifically, China can distort the incidents to turn itself into a victim so it is “forced” to take action of "law enforcement".

With the asymmetry of economic and military power, the victory in the bilateral conflict will belong to whoever is stronger, regardless of justice. Namely, China will score two consecutive scores in the chain of provoking acts to "redefine" regional order. Vietnam/the Philippines will lose two scores.

We can see that, if Vietnam/the Philippines conducts "defensive reaction" unilaterally, then the "redefinition" of regional order will go faster. Anticipating that result, from the outset, when China took provoking acts (oil rig 981 or the invasion of the Scarborough Shoal), Vietnam/the Philippines will choose to send diplomatic note of opposition, or patiently conduct propaganda, without doing the safeguard action in practice. The outcome is that China only scores 1 point. Vietnam/the Philippines loses only one point on the protection of sovereignty. Anyway, the sovereignty of Vietnam/the Philippines is still being abused.

To be continued…

Le Hong Nhat

About the author: Nhat has a Ph.D. diploma of economics at the Stanford University (USA). He is now a lecturer at the University of Economics - Law, National University of HCM City and a non-resident senior fellow at the Saigon Center for International Studies (SCIS), HCM City University of Social Sciences and Humanities.

This article was first published at the SCIC and published on VietNamNet under the cooperation program with Nghiencuuquocte.org.