PFC is the highest, most severe level of monitoring regarding intellectual property (IP) protection and enforcement under the USTR's annual Special 301 report, usually reserved for countries that the US believes have major and long-standing issues in IP protection and enforcement.

With an unusually forceful style of governance, the peak enforcement period is set from May 7 to May 30. Market management and customs forces are tasked with increasing enforcement cases by at least 20 percent. Localities must establish interdisciplinary working groups headed by the Provincial People's Committee Chairs. A mechanism for rapid daily reporting and weekly reporting to the Prime Minister has also been established.

Thr Prime Minister also requested the Supreme People's Procuracy of Vietnam and the Supreme People's Court of Vietnam to accelerate investigations, prosecutions and trials of several high-profile IP infringement cases to strengthen deterrence.

From a governance perspective, this is not a "propaganda campaign" but a real law enforcement movement.

Perhaps the Government understands that this is no longer simply about a few illegal movie-streaming websites.

The question is whether people have ever seriously thought about whether the computer they are using runs licensed software or pirated versions.

For many Vietnamese consumers, using cracked versions of Windows or Office has long been treated as normal, even as a rational way to save costs.

But the world now seems to no longer view that so simply. When Vietnam was still at the simple outsourcing stage, IP was sometimes viewed as a "development cost." But in the new period, when Vietnam starts to talk about AI, semiconductors, data centers, or technology enterprises in the spirit of Resolution 57, copyright and IP become something almost unavoidable.

A semiconductor investor does not just look at land lease prices or tax incentives. What they care about much more is whether technology secrets are protected, whether data is safe, and whether patents are truly enforced. In high-tech industries, people do not just buy and sell goods; they buy and sell the trust that their technology will not be copied.

And perhaps, this is the most thought-provoking point of the PFC story. 

In 2025, Vietnam's trade surplus with the US reached nearly $180 billion, a figure large enough for Washington to pay special attention. In the context of the US tightening rules of origin, restructuring supply chains, and reducing dependence on China, any Vietnamese profile from data and e-commerce to IP can quickly be "politicized."

Actually, behind the PFC is a larger shift in global trade. The world is moving very fast from competing on low costs to competing on standards, technology, and the reliability of the supply chain. 

This also means that Vietnam's growth model, based mainly on cheap labor, investment incentives, and large-scale exports, is beginning to reach its "resilience limit" in a world that increasingly emphasizes standards and economic security.

If Vietnam is seen as a "high-risk" link in the technology supply chain, the price to pay may not lie in a few immediate tax lines but in the hesitation of high-tech capital flows and the trust of major partners. 

This is particularly noteworthy as Vietnam is betting heavily on Resolution 57 with ambitions to develop AI, semiconductors, digital technology enterprises, and an innovative economy.

Because it will be very difficult to form a true innovation ecosystem if startups' products are constantly copied, pirated software is widely used, and IP assets are not safe enough for businesses to dare to invest long-term in core technology.

However, looking at the positive side, this pressure can also become a boost for Vietnam to upgrade its business environment and step deeper into the high-tech economy. 

Development history shows that many economies only truly tightened IP protection when domestic enterprises began to own their own technology, software, data, and patents.

That is also beginning to appear in Vietnam. 

Vietnamese games are cracked. Digital content is copied. Tech startups have their products copied almost immediately before they can even make money. This means that Vietnamese enterprises are now no longer just "infringers," but are increasingly becoming the parties that need protection.

Vietnam's IP problem now is no longer just about "meeting US requirements" or avoiding immediate trade pressure. In the long term, this is actually the problem of protecting Vietnam's own businesses and technology.

Lan Anh