Decree 232, which amends and supplements several provisions of Decree 24/2012 on gold trading management, marks a significant shift: from “monopoly” to “open  - ,” from administrative command to disciplined  -  governance.

Stricter regulations, higher standards

Under Decree 232, eligible enterprises and commercial banks may be granted licenses to produce gold bullion. However, the “open door” policy does not mean just anyone can enter.

Enterprises must have a minimum charter capital of 1 trillion VND (about 39.2 million USD), while commercial banks require at least 50 trillion VND (approximately 1.96 billion USD). Moreover, entities must not have any administrative violations - or if they do, they must have fully rectified them. Beyond financial strength, they must establish rigorous internal procedures from material sourcing to production, quality control, data storage, and real-time connectivity with the State Bank of Vietnam (SBV).

Transparency is paramount in trading: public disclosure of buying and selling prices is mandatory; no delegation to intermediaries is allowed. Organizations must also store customer transaction data (including identification, tax codes, and transaction values) and submit periodic reports to the SBV.

This means only entities with strong financial reputations, management capacity, and strict legal compliance can join the game. Of the 38 currently licensed bullion trading organizations, only a handful of major players are expected to meet the new production standards.

Notably, Decree 232 was issued following a May 28 meeting between General Secretary To Lam and the Central Economic Policy Committee, where he emphasized: “We must shift from an administrative mindset to disciplined  -  thinking - from ‘tightening to control’ to ‘opening to govern’; eliminate the idea of ‘ban it if you can't manage it.’”

This guiding principle applies not only to the gold  -  but to the broader economy. For years, a “prohibition mindset” stifled innovation, promoted a culture of permissions, and distorted  - s.

Previously, the state monopolized gold production to maintain stability. Now, the focus is to let the  -  operate - with strict discipline and oversight. It marks a change in mindset: the state transitions from “player” to “referee.”

Monopoly was a product of its time

To understand the significance of today’s shift, one must look back at the origins of gold monopoly.

Decree 24/2012 emerged amid the “gold storm” of 2008–2012: inflation soared into double digits, the local currency depreciated, and citizens rushed to hoard gold as a financial lifeline. Foreign currency flowed out of the country, worsening economic instability.

In response, the government took unprecedented action - monopolizing bullion production, with only SJC (Saigon Jewelry Company) designated as the “national gold.” Vietnam became one of only two countries, alongside North Korea, to adopt such a model.

Though intended to stabilize the  - , 13 years of implementation produced the opposite effect.

The price gap between domestic and global gold widened dramatically - from a few hundred thousand to as much as 20 million VND per tael (roughly 785 USD). This disparity became a “goldmine” for smuggling, draining foreign currency. The smuggling case of six tons of gold worth 8.4 trillion VND (about 329 million USD) from Cambodia is just the tip of the iceberg.

The “national” branding of SJC inadvertently downgraded all other gold brands, despite comparable quality. This eroded business trust, stripped consumers of choice, and stifled  -  competition.

The dual role of the SBV - both regulator and participant via SJC - also created a conflict of interest. In late 2024, several SJC leaders, including the CEO, were prosecuted for profiteering under the guise of price stabilization, exposing the dark side of monopoly.

A report from the Central Economic Policy Committee highlighted four consequences: rigid management unable to react to global supply-demand shifts, monopoly suppressing competition, failure to mobilize domestic gold reserves for development, and a sluggish, outdated business model.

A Fulbright research group noted that gold  -  volatility stems not from speculative behavior but from macroeconomic instability and global uncertainty. Citizens buy gold simply to protect themselves.

These shortcomings have intensified in recent years. Domestic gold prices have consistently exceeded global prices by 18–20 million VND per tael. Bullion supply is scarce after years without new production, while gold jewelry is increasingly exported.

In 2024, long queues of people waiting to buy gold - limited to just 1 tael or a few tenths of a tael per person - highlighted the absurdity of a  -  where people scramble for a product labeled “national.” A scenario unique to monopoly.

From “player” back to “referee”

In light of this, calls to “free” the gold  -  have grown louder - from businesses, experts, and the Vietnam Gold Traders Association.

The Prime Minister issued a clear directive: narrow the domestic-international gold price gap to just 1–2%. This is now a measurable benchmark for policy success.

With Decree 232 allowing multiple qualified enterprises and banks to produce bullion, the long-standing supply shortage may finally be resolved. A more competitive  -  will bring domestic prices closer to global rates. Discipline and transparency will replace the monopolistic privilege.

Thirteen years of gold monopoly offer a costly lesson: administrative fiat cannot govern a  -  shaped by supply and demand.

Decree 232 marks a shift in mindset - government steps back from the role of “player” and assumes its rightful position as “referee,” building frameworks and ensuring transparent oversight.

If this philosophy is fully embraced, not only the gold  -  but many other sectors could be unlocked. A disciplined, transparent gold  -  will stand as a testament to institutional reform: from “ban if unmanageable” to “govern to develop.”

Only then can Vietnam's economy truly unlock its potential and restore  -  confidence.

Tu Giang