Shortly after the US placed Vietnam in the “Priority Foreign Country” (PFC) category - the highest level of intellectual property monitoring - the Prime Minister launched a nationwide campaign against intellectual property infringement with an unusually forceful style of governance.

This is the most severe designation in the USTR’s annual Special 301 Report and is typically reserved for countries that Washington believes have major and persistent shortcomings in intellectual property protection and enforcement.

The peak enforcement period has been clearly defined from May 7 to May 30. Market surveillance authorities and customs agencies have been assigned targets to increase the number of enforcement cases by at least 20%.

Local governments are required to establish inter-agency task forces led directly by provincial People’s Committee chairpersons. A rapid daily reporting mechanism and weekly reports to the Prime Minister have also been introduced.

Most notably, the Prime Minister has requested that the Supreme People’s Procuracy and the Supreme People’s Court accelerate the investigation, prosecution and trial of several major intellectual property cases to strengthen deterrence.

From a governance perspective, this no longer resembles the familiar style of “awareness campaigns”. It increasingly carries the characteristics of a genuine law enforcement operation.

Perhaps the government understands that this issue is no longer simply about a few piracy websites.

The more uncomfortable question is whether Vietnamese consumers have ever seriously considered whether the computers they use run licensed software or cracked programs.

For many years, using pirated Windows software or cracked Office suites was treated as perfectly normal in Vietnam, even viewed as a practical way to save money.

But the world no longer appears to see the issue so casually.

When Vietnam was primarily positioned in low-value manufacturing, intellectual property was sometimes viewed as merely a “cost of development”. But as the country begins speaking seriously about AI, semiconductors, data centers and technology enterprises under the spirit of Resolution 57, copyright and intellectual property have become issues that are increasingly impossible to avoid.

A semiconductor investor does not focus only on land lease costs or tax incentives. More importantly, investors want to know whether technological secrets are protected, whether data is secure and whether patents are genuinely enforceable.

In high-tech industries, companies are not simply trading products. They are trading trust that their technologies will not be copied.

And perhaps that is the most important implication behind the PFC designation.

In 2025, Vietnam’s trade surplus with the US reached nearly US$180 billion - a figure large enough to attract serious attention in Washington.

At a time when the US is tightening rules on product origin, restructuring supply chains and reducing dependence on China, any Vietnamese issue involving data, e-commerce or intellectual property can quickly become politicized.

In reality, the PFC issue reflects a broader transformation in global trade. The world is rapidly shifting away from competition based on low costs toward competition based on standards, technology and supply chain reliability.

That also means Vietnam’s growth model - built largely on cheap labor, investment incentives and large-scale exports - is beginning to encounter the “limits of resilience” in a world increasingly focused on standards and economic security.

If Vietnam comes to be viewed as a “high-risk” link in technology supply chains, the cost may not lie in immediate tariffs, but rather in hesitation from high-tech capital flows and declining confidence among major partners.

This is especially significant as Vietnam places enormous expectations on Resolution 57 and its ambitions in AI, semiconductors, digital technology enterprises and the innovation economy.

It will be difficult to build a genuine innovation ecosystem if startups constantly face product copying, software piracy remains widespread and intellectual assets are not secure enough for businesses to invest long term in core technologies.

Still, viewed positively, the current pressure could become a powerful catalyst for Vietnam to upgrade its business environment and move deeper into the high-tech economy.

History shows that many economies only began strictly protecting intellectual property once domestic businesses started developing their own technologies, software, data and patents.

That trend is now beginning to emerge in Vietnam.

Vietnamese games are being cracked. Digital content is copied. Technology startups often see their products replicated almost immediately before they can generate profits.

This means Vietnamese businesses are no longer merely seen as “violators”. Increasingly, they are becoming the parties that need protection themselves.

Perhaps that is why Vietnam’s intellectual property challenge is no longer simply about “meeting US demands” or avoiding short-term trade pressure.

In the long term, this is fundamentally about protecting Vietnam’s own businesses and technologies.

A country that wants to develop AI, semiconductors, digital enterprises and an innovation-driven economy will ultimately need to create an environment where intellectual property is secure enough for companies to confidently invest in core technologies over the long term.

What Vietnam needs may not simply be stronger anti-piracy measures, but the construction of an economy capable of living on its own technology, data and creativity.

At that point, protecting intellectual property will become not just an external obligation, but an internal necessity for both businesses and the broader economy.

Lan Anh