For small economies, success does not come from scale or resources.

As Taiwan and Singapore have shown, it starts with a simple but fundamental question: who are we in the global value chain - and what position can we hold that no one else can easily replace?

This logic applies to nations just as it does to individuals. To build a viable strategy, one must first understand their own strengths, weaknesses, limitations, and unique advantages. Only then can they find a distinct niche - not by doing everything, but by doing one thing exceptionally well.

Taiwan didn’t invent semiconductors. It’s not a hub of theoretical chip design or fundamental physics - fields long dominated by the US, Europe, and Japan. But it knew what it was: a small economy with few natural resources and limited room to compete in basic research.

So it made a clear and disciplined choice: to master the single most difficult and capital-intensive part of the semiconductor value chain - advanced chip manufacturing.

At the heart of this strategy stands TSMC, the world’s most advanced chip foundry. TSMC doesn’t design chips - it leaves that to Apple, Nvidia, AMD, and Qualcomm. What it does is harder: fabricating chips at nanometer-scale precision, approaching atomic-level accuracy.

This is not “outsourced assembly.” It’s the result of years of deep R&D in process engineering - from EUV lithography and novel materials to vibration, heat, and dust control, factory automation, and yield optimization.

This ability to manufacture at the very frontier of technology gives Taiwan not only economic strength but also geopolitical leverage. It may not invent the chip, but the world cannot bring that chip to life without Taiwan.

Unlike basic scientific research, Taiwan invested in applied industrial research - making production faster, more stable, and scalable. It turned manufacturing into a strategic asset, anchoring the world’s most critical supply chains in its own ecosystem.

Singapore, meanwhile, took a different path - not mastering one deep technical field, but building the most trusted environment where all technologies can operate.

Singapore understood early on: it had no natural resources, no large domestic market, and limited chances to lead in fundamental science. So it asked a different question: how do we become the indispensable connector?

Its answer: build a multi-pillar ecosystem spanning finance, law, digital infrastructure, logistics, higher education, and applied technologies like biotech, fintech, and AI.

Singapore doesn’t just succeed because it’s rich or high-tech. It succeeds because it built a system - transparent laws, stable taxation, strong IP protection, and an English-speaking workforce trained in global business culture.

This institutional stability has made it the command center for global companies from the US, Europe, China, and Japan. Singapore may not be the factory - it’s the brain that coordinates the factory.

These two cases - Taiwan’s depth in manufacturing and Singapore’s breadth in coordination - offer valuable lessons for both countries and companies.

In business, as in geopolitics, success isn’t about chasing every trend or copying others. It’s about defining your core advantage and holding a position of value that others need but can’t easily replace.

Taiwan and Singapore didn’t get where they are by spreading themselves thin. They chose, committed, and built relentlessly over decades.

While their models differ, they share one thing: they knew exactly who they were - and built everything around that insight.

Taiwan didn’t succeed with just TSMC. It took a long-term industrial strategy - consistent investment in technical education, infrastructure, and domestic enterprise. Singapore’s strength isn’t just in finance or tech - it lies in a coherent, transparent, and stable system that global business can trust.

Vietnam, too, must begin with the same fundamental question: who are we?

This is not just a matter of picking industries or technologies. It’s about building the institutional framework - the rules of the game - that make long-term strategy possible.

Vietnam does not lack ambition or opportunity. What it lacks is a set of clearly defined, credible, and lasting priorities that align national resources, policies, and human capital toward a strategic goal.

Without such a strategy, it risks trying to do everything - spreading support across too many sectors, labeling everything a “priority,” and failing to build real capacity in anything.

A good national strategy doesn’t have to be flashy. It just needs to answer three hard questions:

Where do we want to be in the global value chain?

Which fields will we truly prioritize?

And how will the state use education, science, investment, diplomacy, and regulation to build long-term capacity in those areas?

Only when these answers are clear - and consistently executed - can businesses plan long-term, society train the right workforce, and Vietnam carve out a place in the world that others cannot ignore.

Tran Si Chuong